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— ABSTRACT —
The annexation of Crimea is not an ordinary 
event in contemporary international relations� 
Since WWII, there has been no precedent in 
Europe when one state under dubious premises 
has forcefully annexed a part of another state� 
This article scrutinizes the Crimean case in the 
context of the ongoing Ukrainian crisis and 
uncovers the rationale behind Russia’s aggressive 
policies in the Black Sea Region� To accomplish 
this task, several steps have been undertaken� 
Primarily, the recent speeches of Russian officials 
and Kremlin-originated documents have been 
analyzed� Secondly, the tactics favored by the 
Kremlin to achieve its geopolitical goals have 
been explained and assessed (through applying 
frameworks of meta-geography and soft power 
security)� Thirdly, the future prospects for Crimea 
with its gradual transformation in the counter-
NATO fortress have been outlined�
— ABSTRAKT —
Aneksja Krymu nie wydaje się być zwykłym 
wydarzeniem we współczesnych stosunkach 
międzynarodowych� Od czasów II wojny 
światowej nie doszło jeszcze do precedensu 
w Europie, kiedy jedno państwo na podstawie 
wątpliwych przesłanek forsownie aneksowało 
fragment innego państwa� Ten artykuł ma za 
zadanie analizę aneksji Krymu w  kontekście 
trwającego kryzysu ukraińskiego i  określenie 
podstaw agresywnej polityki Rosji w regionie 
Morza Czarnego� W tym celu zostały podjęte 
następujące kroki� Przede wszystkim przeanali-
zowane zostały ostatnie wypowiedzi rosyjskich 
urzędników i oficjalne dokumenty Kremla� Po 
drugie, opisana i wyjaśniona została (poprzez 
zastosowanie metodologii meta-geografii i soft 
power security) ulubiona taktyka Kremla do 
osiągania swoich celów geopolitycznych� Po 
trzecie, przedstawione zostały perspektywy 
rozwoju Krymu uwzględniające jego stopniową 
transformację w antynatowską twierdzę�
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INTRODUCTION
The chain of events which started in Ukraine on the 21 of November 2013 and 
continues up to now, came as a shock to many� On that day, the authorities 
of Ukraine officially suspended the state’s European aspirations, this action 
triggered massive anti-governmental rallies� These rallies became extremely 
violent over time, encouraging external intervention in the originally internal 
conflict� Consequently, Ukraine lost the Crimean peninsula to Russia and 
has since plunged into war with Russian-backed separatists in its eastern part 
(Tsygankov, 2015)� Western states, in their turn, faced with the first forceful 
breach of sovereignty in Europe in the new millennium, imposed sanctions to 
cool Russia’s aggressive behavior down, and as such a revival Cold War discourse 
can be observed�
It is in everyone’s interest to have Ukraine as a peaceful and cooperative 
partner� From the geopolitical perspective, the state is situated on one of the 
world’s major crossroads, in particular on an intersection of Europe-Asia and 
Nordic-Mediterranean transport corridors (Delanoe, 2014; Götz, 2015; Kushnir, 
Domaradzki, 2013)� Its position on the northern Black Sea shores also provides 
Ukraine with a strategic depth in promoting regional trade and security� How-
ever, external actors tend to perceive their cooperation with Ukraine differently� 
On the one hand, the West considers Ukraine as a self-sufficient player which 
requires assistance in strengthening its democracy, free market, and good-
governance� This modus operandi seems to be coherent and attractive for present 
day Ukrainians, as proved by their participation in the anti-governmental rallies 
(Wawrzonek, 2014)� On the other hand, Russia is keen to keep Ukraine within its 
political orbit, thus establishing some kind of a supervised “buffer zone” between 
mainland Russia and the rest of Europe (Götz, 2015)�
Actually, Russia seems to be one of the most ambitious and ambiguous actors 
in the region� Its behavior is not always rational, but fueled by the geopolitical 
necessity to expand and attempts to restore “historical justice” – at least this is 
how the Kremlin perceives it (Horbulin, 2015)�
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Russian geopolitics, Russian foreign policy, 
Crimean annexation, critical geopolitics, meta-
geography
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As one may recall, the Black Sea became a Soviet controlled “pool” after 
World War II� However, the Kremlin’s domination in the region was severely 
undermined by the USSR demolition after the Cold War� Sovereign Russia 
yielded influence over its former satellites – Bulgaria and Romania – with their 
Black Sea ports and industries� The most of the northern coastline was “inher-
ited” by the re-emerged Ukraine� These and other factors triggered geopolitical 
discomfort for Russia; its presence in the Black Sea littoral was limited to around 
450 km of the coastline on the Caucasus (Delanoe, 2014)� Here lies the root of 
the “historical injustice” – Russia, as the direct descendant of the USSR, was 
stripped of its significant maritime possessions it perceived as indisputably Rus-
sian� Throughout the recent decades the Kremlin drew plans to bring these lands 
back and – simultaneously – re-establish control over the “pool”� The annexation 
of Crimea, as well as earlier Russian engagement in Transnistria, Abkhazia, and 
Adjara (unsuccessful), were nothing but firm steps to fulfill these plans�
To achieve its goals in the post-communist space, the Kremlin utilizes 
various tactics which can be generally defined as the export and subsequent 
enrooting of the Russian model of governance (Socor, 2005; Jackson, 2006)� 
This model presumes the presence of strong authoritarian leaders whose powers 
are nourished by organized crime and the state’s secret services� On acquiring 
key positions, these leaders introduce a sophisticated bureaucracy, which in 
its turn cultivates “shadow” economics and establishes indirect governmental 
supervision over big and/or strategic enterprises� The legitimacy of such a politi-
cal shift is not questioned as an aggressive media brainwashing and the blatant 
prosecution of political opponents is pursued� The way Crimea was annexed 
can provide a bright example of these tactics in action� What are worse, Kremlin 
agents were able to fulfill their tasks because of the passiveness of the Ukrainian 
authorities and the lenience of a “united” Europe� In a word, the key decision-
makers in Kyiv and in the West disregarded the first signs of the Kremlin’s 
geopolitical offensive�
This article addresses the issue of the annexation of Crimea by Russia from 
various perspectives� Primarily, it describes and explains the way Russia sup-
ported and cherished Crimean separatism between 1990 and 2014� Secondly, 
it uncovers and critically assesses the rationale behind Russian revisionist and 
expansionist politics in the region� Thirdly, it scrutinizes the tactics utilized by 
the Kremlin to achieve its geopolitical goals (on the example of Crimea)� Finally, 
it reveals the geopolitical importance of Crimea to Russia, as well as draws pros-
pects of the development of the peninsula for the nearest future�
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As the methodology is concerned, it will reside in combining classical and 
critical geopolitics� The first – state-centered Hobbesian approach – will allow to 
explain the rationale behind the Russian aggressive behaviour in its neighbor-
hood� It seems feasible – on the first glance – that such type of behavior solidifies 
the power of the Kremlin on domestic level through evoking “rally around the 
flag” effect, as well as reassures the state’s ability to project its power and national 
interests globally� In a word, classical geopolitics is a suitable tool to assess costs 
and benefits the Russian state experiences while conducting aggressive foreign 
policy� In its turn, critical geopolitics will allow to unveil the mechanisms 
which Russia utilizes to achieve its objectives in the post-Cold War world� The 
paradoxical assumption here is that Russia pursues national interests through 
a utilization of mechanisms which emerged in liberal democratic societies to 
limit the state’s power (i�e�, empowerment of the individuals and non-state actors, 
political pluralism, freedom of speech and communication, social networking, 
and others)� One should particularly consider in this regards Colin Flint’s meta-
geographic frameworks (Flint, 2006)�
LOGICS BEHIND RUSSIAN AGGRESSION IN THE BLACK SEA REGION
The beginning of 2007 was a milestone for contemporary Russian geopoliti-
cal expansion� At this moment several specific factors came into being: Russia 
regained its economic sufficiency and foresaw uninterrupted growth; the 
U�S� witnessed signs of domestic fatigue with the War on Terror and global 
engagement; the EU was to enter the first waves of economic crisis; the series 
of noticeable revolutions took place in the European neighborhood, and others� 
In a word, that was the time when the appropriate environment emerged which 
allowed Russia to re-draw its foreign policy and start the implementation of its 
old-new objectives�
On 12 February 2007, during the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy, 
President Vladimir Putin delivered one of the key speeches of recent times� He 
outlined the forthcoming changes in the Russia’s geopolitical objectives (Putin, 
2007)� In some respect this speech may be regarded as a declaration of Cold War 
2�0; at least, it contained clear allusions to sinister Soviet rhetoric�
Putin seemed to speak honestly on his new modus operandi� He stated with 
bitterness that the world after 1991 became unipolar with the U�S� taking the 
unchallenged lead� That was a wrong turn, according to the President� The 
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U�S� accumulated too much power thus making impossible the natural develop-
ment of other sovereign entities; every state on the globe was doomed to exist in 
the shadow of Washington’s interests� What was worse, these interests were not 
always complying with international law (Forsberg, Herd, 2015)�
Putin also addressed the role of international organizations which he consid-
ered to be biased and one-sided� For instance, he declared that the OSCE acted 
as the U�S� and the EU subsidiary, not as a neutral force for common good� As 
he put it: “People are trying to transform the OSCE into a vulgar instrument 
designed to promote the foreign policy interests of one or a group of countries” 
(Putin, 2007)� Referring to NATO, Putin stressed its “two-faced” nature� To prove 
this, he mentioned the Alliance’s expansion into Eastern and Central Europe, 
contradicting the promises given by the NATO General Secretary Manfred 
Wörner to the Soviet Union on 17 May 1990� In a word, on the OSCE and 
NATO examples Putin demonstrated his proneness to perceive international 
organizations as nodes in Western networks� This should be kept in mind in 
order to explain contemporary Russian political behavior�
Apart from this, Putin sent a clear message to the world that the Kremlin 
would defend its interests as never before� That would be a proper response on 
the external provocative actions� According to the President, his state had always 
been “cheated” by its Western “partners” through empty promises, unilateral 
actions and unfulfilled obligations� This should not and would not be the pattern 
in the future: “We very often […] hear appeals by our partners […] to the effect 
that Russia should play an increasingly active role in world affairs� In connection 
with this I would allow myself to make one small remark […] Russia is a country 
with a history that spans more than a thousand years and has practically always 
used the privilege to carry out an independent foreign policy� We are not going 
to change this tradition today� At the same time […] we would like to interact 
with responsible and independent partners with whom we could work together 
in constructing a fair and democratic world order that would ensure security 
and prosperity not only for a select few, but for all” (Putin, 2007)�
As one may see, Putin’s speech in Munich signaled the climax of Russia’s 
dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs� The President argued that the 
global architecture was unjust, the U�S� undermined principles of international 
coexistence, and Russia found itself in a position of geopolitical inferiority1� 
1  The same objectives were reiterated in the Foreign Ministry report A Review of the Russian 
Federation’s Foreign Policy published on 27 March 2007� The report presented Russia as a power ready 
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To fix these flaws, Putin announced his state’s likely return to the Soviet-style 
non-compromised policies (Hughes, Sasse, 2016)�
Seven years later, on 18 March 2014, Putin delivered another noticeable 
speech (Putin, 2014)� That was his address to the Federal Assembly of the Rus-
sian Federation in the Kremlin� The speech – commonly referred today as the 
Crimean speech – was delivered on the eve of the military conflict bursting out 
in the Donbass region, Eastern Ukraine� That speech stressed, factually, the same 
points and positions as they had been outlined in 2007�
Primarily, Putin reiterated that there was no longer stability after the dis-
solution of the bipolar world� The U�S� along with its allies were inclined to 
undermine international order and instead preferred to follow the “rule of gun”, 
not the rule of law� Russia as the USSR successor felt itself plundered and robbed 
in the environment of the U�S� hegemony2�
Secondly, international institutions and organizations discredited themselves 
in ensuring global security and order� Putin considered them to be nothing but 
biased agents acting under the supervision of Western states�
Thirdly, Russian interests were systematically ignored, especially in the post-
communist space� Putin was of the opinion that Western states were constantly 
lying to him about their intentions and future actions (i�e�, NATO expansion, 
EU neighborhood program, and others; Forsberg, Herd, 2015; Götz, 2015; 
Tsygankov, 2015)� Moreover, they were always secretly conducting the policies of 
“containment”, thus attempting, as Putin said, “to sweep us into a corner because 
we have an independent position” (Putin, 2014)�
Finally, Putin underlined that no one should underestimate Russia’s delib-
eration to take decisive and “just” actions: “Russia is an independent, active 
participant in international affairs; like other countries, it has its own national 
interests that need to be taken into account and respected” (Putin, 2014)�
There were, however, some new interesting points in the address to Parliament� 
For instance, Putin presented recent revolutions – so called “colored” revolutions 
– in the post-communist space as Western-inspired and Western-orchestrated 
(Darczewska, 2014)� These revolutions brought nothing but harm to the citizens 
to influence international relations by challenging the actions of others if they were “unilateral” and 
disrespectful of international law (for more details see: Tsygankov, 2015)�
2  As Forsberg and Herd present it, Putin’s Russia struggles to replace the U�S�’s “power vertical” 
with a “democratic multi-polarity” and “a new version of interdependence”� Putin also considers his 
state to be on “the right side of history”, aiming to become an independent pole in this post-Western 
global order (for more details see: Forsberg, Herd, 2015)�
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of the targeted states; new emerging orders completely disregarded the “way of 
life, traditions, and cultures of the indigenous population” (Tsygankov, 2015)� 
Thus, Putin presented these revolutions as artificial, bringing illegitimate elites to 
power� In the case of Ukraine, he stated that the forces behind the 2014 Maidan 
“resorted to terror, murder and riots� Nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes and 
anti-Semites executed this coup” (Putin, 2014)�
In respect to the annexation of Crimea, Putin stressed that “Crimea is our 
common historical legacy and a very important factor in regional stability� And 
this strategic territory should be a part of a strong and stable sovereignty, which 
today can only be Russian” (Putin, 2014)� Except for the symbolic and strategic 
importance of Crimea to Russia, Putin perceived the annexation as a “right and 
just action”� He claimed that Crimea had been given to Ukraine in 1991 as a “sack 
of potatoes” with Russia being too weak to claim its rights on the peninsula� In 
between 1990 – 2014, Russia had to restrain its Crimean ambitions because of 
its respect to Ukrainian sovereignty� However, as Putin presented it, the 2014 
illegitimate coup d’état in Ukraine provided Russia with a legitimate right to act 
(Putin, 2014)�
Both of the above-mentioned speeches unveil the implementation of Rus-
sia’s behavioral patterns provisioned by Klaus Dodds in 2007 (Dodds, 2007)� 
These patterns derived from the excessive assertiveness the Bush administration 
implemented in its War on Terror, thus undermining the global geopolitical 
architecture� Therefore, Putin’s interventions in Georgia (2008) and Ukraine 
(2014) are nothing else but attempts to mirror the ambiguous U�S� actions� 
However, Putin not only mirrors these actions, but provides them with specific 
meaning to meet Russia’s objectives� Both speeches mentioned above – as well 
as a majority of Putin’s other public speeches – clearly illustrate this� Utilizing 
aggressive policies, as Putin accuses the U�S� to utilize, Russia re-draws the world 
order, gains global weight, and withstands its national interests (Forsberg, Herd, 
2016)3�
3  Gerber and Zavisca define the contemporary Russian political and media narrative in the 
following way: “1) the United States is a powerful but malign force that seeks to dominate and sub-
jugate the world; 2) it pursues this aim by fomenting instability, chaos, and, ultimately, «color revo-
lution» in countries it perceives as rivals; 3) its means of doing so include funding groups that oppose 
the legitimate leaders of these countries and otherwise promoting discontent under the guise of 
support for abstract institutions it calls «democracy» or «human rights»; and 4) Russia, with its re-
sources and its alternative institutions and culture, is the only force in the world capable of resisting 
U�S� domination and control” (for more details see: Gerber, Zavisca, 2016)�
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Putin seems to be sure that Western states perform “orchestrated revolu-
tions” or “legalized interventions” in order to lead their favorites to power in key 
states or regions� At least this may be indirectly deduced from the 2002 National 
Security Strategy which outlines the U�S� objectives in the War on Terror� In 
particular, the Strategy articulates the U�S� intention to “defend the peace by 
fighting terrorists and tyrants” (The National Security Strategy…, 2002)� This 
statement may be widely interpreted; thus, the 2002 Security Strategy – along 
with the next years’ Strategies and similar documents – provide a fertile soil for 
Kremlin analysts to claim that the U�S� secret services are actively engaged in 
fighting “legitimate authorities” in third states overseas (i�e�, Syria, Libya, Iraq, 
Egypt and others)� This is where the U�S� national interest resides� Therefore, 
Russia as an actor with global ambitions should follow – apparently – the same 
pattern of the “strong”�
This pattern, by the way, was outlined for the first time in the 2000 Russian 
Military Doctrine (Military Doctrine of Russian Federation, 2000) and re-stated 
in the Military Doctrine of 2010 (Military Doctrine of Russian Federation, 2010)� 
Both documents appeared during Putin’s time in power� Both clearly specify 
the key military dangers for the Russian Federation which may require military 
responses� In the Doctrine of 2010 one should particularly consider provisions 
8b, 8d, 8u, and 20�
The provision 8b states that any attempt to destabilize the situation in various 
countries and regions, thus undermining their strategic stability, poses a danger 
to Russia� The provision 8d defines as dangerous any territorial claim against 
Russia and its allies, as well as interference in their internal affairs� In its turn, 
the provision 8u justifies Russia’s action in case there is the emergence of any 
armed conflict on the territories adjacent to Russia or it allies� All three provide 
carta scribi rationale for Russian engagement into global and regional affairs� 
Apparently, the Kremlin reserves itself the right to define the magnitude of any 
global or local danger�
As far as military action is concerned, the provision 20 states that Russia 
finds it appropriate to (i) use armed forces in case of external aggression against 
it or its allies; (ii) in case the UN or any other collective security body initiates 
peacekeeping or peace restoring mission; or (iii) in case Russian citizens require 
protection overseas (Laruelle, 2015)� It is clearly stressed in the Doctrine that if 
armed forces are called into action, Russia will operate within the frameworks of 
international law and its international obligations� The final decision on deploy-
ing troops belongs to the President of Russia�
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Much in line with what the Russian Military Doctrines claim can be discov-
ered in the recent 2014 Kremlin-originated report On Russia’s National Identity 
Transformation and New Foreign Policy Doctrine (Zevelev, 2014)� According to 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, the report provides justifications for the Russian harsh 
policies abroad: “The key concepts of this report are four: first, that of «a divided 
people»; secondly, the theme of «protecting compatriots abroad»; third and more 
broadly, «the Russian World» or «Ruski Mir» in Russian; fourth, the importance 
of acknowledging and sustaining, embracing and promoting «the Great Russian 
civilization»� I mention this because I think it would be an error to think that 
Crimea and Ukraine are just the products of a sudden outrage” (Brzezinski, 
2014)�
As one may deduce, Brzezinski argues that the Russian authorities are delib-
erate to construct – or restore – what they call the Great Russian civilization4� 
They are prone to accomplish that task through the strengthening of Russia’s 
presence in the states with significant Russian minorities or simply Russian 
speaking people� Hence the task is treated as right and historically decisive and 
almost sacred, any occurring conflicts of interest are likely to be disregarded 
or – whether possible – resolved by the implementation of international law5� 
Russian deliberation to achieve the favorable results is so significant that Putin 
demonstrates his readiness to challenge the global balance of power, openly 
assaulting the U�S� and Western states, and to provide military assistance to 
the third parties, and even put the welfare of Russian citizens at risk (Kushnir, 
2016)�
4  The same as Brzezinski, Szostek states that the contemporary Russian authorities are accom-
plishing “Civilizational Mission” which, to the word, is widely supported by the common people� 
According to Szostek, this mission emphasizes “the distinctiveness of Russia’s culture and values and 
its responsibility to protect and unify those with whom it has historical ties� Russian-speakers in 
neighboring states are considered «compatriots» (sootechestvenniki), whose «educational, linguistic, 
social, labor, humanitarian, and other rights» Russia must protect” (for more details see: Szostek, 
2014)�
5  Emphasizing sacredness of the Russian “Civilizational Mission” one should consider the spiri-
tual principles of the so-called “Russian World”� Having analyzed the public speeches of the Russian 
Orthodox Church leaders, Wawrzonek concluded that “the Russkiy Mir is a separate and autonomous 
civilizational space, formed […] by elements such as the spirit of tolerance and respect for the rights 
of dissenters, Russian language and culture, and «common views on social development»� According 
to Patriarch Cyril, the mentioned former values have been established by the «common boundaries 
and one geographical area in which our people lived» (here one should consider Kievan Rus, Russian 
Empire, and Soviet Union)” (for more details see: Wawrzonek, 2014)�
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To draw some intermediary conclusions, in 2007 Russia entered a new era in 
its foreign policy which envisages unilateral attempts to reshape the post-Cold 
War order� These attempts are mainly inspired by a specific interpretation of 
the U�S� global actions during the War on Terror and the evolution of the EU’s 
neighborhood policy� Russian authorities – and President Putin in particular 
– perceive the recent Western activities as a special kind of military or “soft 
power” operations which allow for the establishing of legal supervision over key 
states or territories� Moreover, Russian authorities attempt to follow the “Western 
example”: Crimean annexation is the brightest example and the biggest Russian 
success in this regard� To commemorate it, Putin even proclaimed 27 February 
to be the Day of Secret Services in Russia – that was the day the Russian flag 
weaved over the Crimean parliament in 2014 for the first time�
THE CASE OF CRIMEA: HOW RUSSIA MADE IT
It was the U�S� Secretary of State John Kerry who argued that in order to achieve 
its goals in the 21st century Russia utilizes the 19th century tactics “by invading 
another country on completely trumped up pretext” (Dunham, 2014)� However, 
upon deeper scrutiny, this statement may appear to be arguable� The fact is Rus-
sia does not apply straightforward tactics of military intervention; its behavior 
in recent conflicts is more complex and smart� To explain this with the Crimean 
example, one should consider the meta-geographical framework advocated by 
Colin Flint within the critical geopolitics approach� Flint states that: “Geopolitics 
is not just the calculation of countries trying to expand or protect their territory 
and define a political sphere of influence; it is also about countries, businesses, 
and political groups making connections across the globe […] Political power 
is not just a matter of controlling territory, it is also a matter of controlling 
movement, or being able to construct networks to one’s own advantage across 
political boundaries” (Flint, 2006)�
In a word, it may seem that the old-fashioned state-centered geopolitics has 
given its positions up in the liberal democratic environment; the trans-national 
networks and cross-boundary cooperation are what matters now� Those actors 
– especially non-state actors – who can establish and control such networks are 
taking the lead in global decision-making and projecting their influence on new 
territories� That is the truth Kremlin analysts have perfectly learned, converted 
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in accordance to their needs, and started to utilize when pursuing their state’s 
interests6�
The pro-Russian networks in Crimea existed in a dormant state since the 
1990s and were promptly awakened with Putin’s coming to power in 2000s� 
These networks incorporate several key nodes, among them are the Russian 
intelligence, Russian military bases with their infrastructure, the Russian Ortho-
dox Church, pro-Russian NGOs, Russian media, and others� In 2006, the Secret 
Service of Ukraine (SSU) in one of its reports pointed out these nodes and 
warned about dangers they can inflict on the state� According to Taras Kuzio, 
the report was not perceived with all due cautiousness though (Kuzio, 2006; 
ICC News Digest, 2006)�
To assess pro-Russian nodes and their efficiency with more precision, one 
should consider the 2011 research by Lada L� Roslycky� The latter presented 
and assessed Russian activities in Crimea as the “soft power” security threat 
for Ukraine� Through utilizing its informal, but all-penetrating presence on the 
Crimean peninsula, the Russian side managed to switch the attention of the 
indigenous people “from the interests of the state to which they belong and 
toward the interests of the intervening actor” (Roslycky, 2011)� In a word, Russian 
side attempted to pursue its national interest not through applying brutal power, 
but through working with networks and the persistent formation of a favorable 
socio-political environment – with brutal power as the ultimate argument for 
nonconformists� This tactics bared its fruits on the “volatile” soil of Crimea and 
can be scrutinized through the prisms of meta-geography and critical geopolitics�
Speaking of the presence of Russian intelligence services in Crimea, their key 
mission resided in securing the Black Sea Fleet deployed at the Ukrainian terri-
tory and monitoring the dynamics of regional affairs� Apart from this, according 
to Kuzio, Russian intelligence attempted to shape the social moods and political 
6  One should consider the so-called Gerasimov Doctrine in this regard� In 2013, Russian Chief 
of General Staff Valerii Gerasimov emphasized that the role of non-military means of achieving 
political and strategic goals has exceeded the military operations in their effectiveness; the non-
-military operations should occur at a rate of 4:1 over military operations� Gerasimov raised the 
importance of nurturing social dissatisfaction within the target state, undermining the authority of 
local governments, weakening the adversary’s military potential, and creating a vacuum of power� 
This can be achieved, in particular, through manipulations with information and special operation 
in cyber-space� The armed forces – under the peacekeeping disguise – should arrive on the final stage 
of the conflict to secure the success (for more details see: Gerasimov, 2013)�
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life in Crimea through collecting secret information, conducting pro-Russian 
propaganda, and providing indirect support to separatist powers (Kuzio, 2006)� 
Russian intelligence strove to incorporate their agents or sympathizers into the 
republican government, local administrations, law enforcement services, and 
civil society� As Roslycky argues, “Ukraine’s intelligence services identified Rus-
sian intelligence forces as targeting the most pivotal elements of Ukraine’s power 
from within its own territory” (Roslycky, 2011)�
Apart from Russian intelligence services, the role of the Black Sea Fleet 
should not be underestimated� At the beginning of 2014, the fleet was served by 
c� 12 000 service men – including c� 3000 marines – stationed mainly in Crimea 
(Delanoe, 2013; Delanoe, 2014)� To maintain that amount of people necessary 
infrastructure was erected – starting from barracks and shipyards, ending with 
schools and university� This kind of social-through-military policy could not 
but attract Crimeans and shape their world views� Apart from this, Russian 
marines and officers often befriended local people and had families with them, 
this tightened “international ties” even more� Therefore, the “soft” and “hard” 
power the Black Sea Fleet possessed – including the network of people united 
around the fleet – was another significant factor contributing to the success of 
the annexation of Crimea�
As far as the NGOs are concerned, a majority of them functioned as double 
agents� Officially, their aim resided in the promotion of inter-cultural dialogue 
and trans-boundary cooperation; this was justified and appropriate for the region 
with significant Russian-speaking population� Unofficially, they were nurturing 
anti-Ukrainian moods among civil society and promoted ideas that Crimea 
should be “returned” to Russia� Apart from this, numerous organizations were 
also suspected by the SSU in conducting direct separatist activities or money 
laundering (Kuzio, 2006)� In particular, one should speak here about the Rus-
sian Community of Crimea and the youth pro-Russian movements: Proryv, the 
Eurasian Youth Union (till 2011), and Nashi� These organizations also functioned 
in other separatist areas in the Black Sea Region, namely in Transnistria, Abk-
hazia, and South Ossetia� For extra efficiency, they were closely cooperating 
with Russian intelligence, Russian military, and local organized crime groups 
(Roslycky, 2011)�
Another node in the network constituted Russia’s mass-media� Factually, 
one should distinguish here between Russian-owned and Crimean pro-Russian 
mass-media� The latter were well-financed from local sources; this allowed them 
to produce high-quality materials or buy Russian production, thus attracting 
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wider numbers of consumers as if to compare with the mainland Ukrainian 
or Crimean independent media� As Russian-owned media are concerned, they 
were traditionally enjoying high viewers’ and readers’ rates� They were also 
granted a right to broadcast or distribute materials with no restrictions in Crimea 
(Szostek, 2014)� In their activities both kinds of mass media aimed to discredit 
Ukraine as a sovereign state and undermine Kyiv’s European and Trans-Atlantic 
aspirations� They also cherished pro-Russian moods in society and nurtured 
nostalgic feelings for the Soviet times (Gerber, Zavisca, 2016)� The new media – 
including numerous social networks and blogs – pursued the same goals, but 
targeted younger generation�
According to Jolanta Daczewska, Russian-owned and pro-Russian mass 
media in Crimea were implementing principles of political propaganda in their 
activities� One should consider in this regard (i) the principle of massive and long-
lasting impact (media were constantly reiterating key anti-Ukrainian slogans and 
stereotypes; for instance, Ukrainian-speaking people were presented as fascists), 
(ii) the principle of desired information (on the one hand, media convinced Rus-
sians and Russian-speaking recipients that Ukrainian authorities would ban their 
language; on the other hand, media promised recipients sufficient assistance 
and cultural “salvation” from Russia), (iii) the principle of emotional agitation 
(media messages incited emotions and encouraged recipients to act without 
critical assessment of the acquired information), (iv) the clarity principle (media 
simplified their messages and divided the world into black-and-white), (v) the 
principle of supposed obviousness (media linked their messages to political myths: 
the Russian sentiment equals patriotism, Ukrainians equals fascists, Maidan 
equals chaos, etc�) (Darczewska, 2014)� In a word, Russian media activity in 
Crimea provides an appropriate illustration to Valery Gerasimov’s statements 
about the role of non-military means in achieving Russia’s national interests�
The last but not the least among the key nodes of the Russian network is 
the Russian Orthodox Church� Roslicky and Wawrzonek argue that the Church 
always maintained strong connections with the Russian state (Roslycky, 2011; 
Wawrzonek, 2014)� Indeed, in the era of developed absolutism – from 1654 to 
1918 – it was the Monarch who headed the Church� In the communist times the 
activities of the clergy were supervised by the Secret Services� In modern times, 
clergy claims that Church must monitor political life in states that are Orthodox 
by nature and try to adjust it to the spirit of Orthodox civilization (Wawrzonek, 
2014)� Thus, the political role of the Russian Orthodox Church – regardless of 
the epoch – has always exceeded its religious and social mission� Concerning 
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the Crimean case, the Orthodox Church regularly organized marches against 
the arrival of NATO vessels in Sevastopol or against the sole idea of Ukrainian 
cooperation with the West� The temples were often used to store pro-Russian or 
separatist literature� It also happened that the clergy encouraged people to share 
the Russian perspective in any political dispute; Russia was portrayed as the only 
force for good in the world of sin� Not to speak that Patriarch Cyril perceived 
Crimea as one of the pivots of “Holy Russia” and the “Russian World” (Suslov, 
2014)�
Obviously, there were other nodes in the Russian network on the peninsula – 
Black Sea Branch of Moscow State University, Night Wolves motorcycle club, 
local self-defense forces, visiting Russian officials, and others� However, their 
long-term contribution to the annexation of peninsula was not as significant�
As the Maidan was coming to its end in Kyiv – in particular when President 
Viktor Yanukovych fled the country in February 2014 – Kremlin decision-makers 
activated all nodes in Crimea� Blockade and seizing the Crimean parliament, 
orchestrating the dubious appointment of Sergey Aksyonov as the Prime Min-
ister, and finally the running of the pro-independence referendum – that would 
be impossible to complete within days without any preparation (Hughes, Sasse, 
2016)� Especially, in consideration to the Ukrainian Black Sea Fleet which was 
stationed in Sevastopol and the Crimean Tatars who were actively protesting 
against any anti-Ukrainian rallies�
On Aksyonov’s coming to power, a traditional Russian model of governance 
was enrooted on the peninsula� The Prime Minister appeared to be an authori-
tarian leader backed by Russian intelligence, military, organized crime, NGO, 
and mass media� With their help, he almost immediately subdued or blocked 
those regional actors which could hypothetically sustain Ukrainian sovereignty� 
As the final accord, on the 16 March 2014, Aksyonov initiated a referendum 
on Crimean status searching for legal premises to secede the peninsula from 
Ukraine to Russia� With 95% of votes in favor of leaving Ukraine, the Kremlin 
– unlike the rest of the civilized world – recognized the referendum results and 
accepted Crimea as one of Russia’s federal subjects (Hughes, Sasse, 2016)�
As for now, Crimea de jure is Ukrainian, but de facto Russian� Aksyonov and 
his supporters installed the Russian state system on the peninsula with as little 
delay as possible� There were also border crossing points erected on the roads 
connecting Crimea to Ukraine� However, only several non-European countries 
in the world recognized the change of Crimea’s status� That came as a surprise for 
the Kremlin� The non-negotiable position of the West and its pressure on Russia 
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to follow the principles of international law – with the consequent imposition of 
sanctions – became a heavy and unexpected burden for the Kremlin� The fact 
that the majority of Crimean denizens represented Russian culture and ethnici-
ties did not sound convincing� However, this is a topic for another research�
To draw intermediary conclusions, the annexation of Crimea was nothing, 
but a series of long-prepared secret operations under the supervision of Russian 
intelligence� It was perfectly calculated from the perspective of applying “hard” 
and “soft” power� To justify the change in Crimea’s territorial belonging, the 
Kremlin referred to the provisions of Russian military doctrine and the UN 
Charter, reiterated its intention to protect compatriots abroad, and stressed 
the necessity of restoring the post-Cold War justice� Factually, as Russian 
officials – including the President – presented it, Russia had no other option 
but to intervene into Crimean affairs, taking into account the blatant events 
in Kyiv, emerging challenges to Russian sovereignty, and the threats for the 
Russian speaking people in Ukraine� Here one may recall the statement by 
Dodds who claimed that third states are prone to follow the U�S� example of 
conducting aggressive trans-boundary foreign policies� However, the rationale 
behind the U�S� War on Terror and Russian annexation of Crimea was different; 
and thus Russia’s action triggered more than just criticism from key members 
of international society�
THE FUTURE OF CRIMEA: WHY RUSSIA MADE IT
Western political scientists tend to assess the annexation of Crimea from at 
least four major perspectives: (i) annexation as a revival of Russia’s imperialism 
and power aspirations; (ii) annexation as Putin’s attempt to consolidate power 
and address domestic issues; (iii) annexation as a hyper-reaction on democratic 
aspirations in the Russian “Civilizational Space”; and (iv) annexation as Putin’s 
personal dissatisfaction with the Western policies in Ukraine and Ukrainian 
civilizational choice (Tsygankov, 2015)� This research aims to prove that the 
rationale behind Russia’s Crimean annexation resides in achieving geostrategic 
objectives which are largely predefined by the imperial traditions, memories, 
and fears that the Kremlin may irretrievably lose control over lands which were 
once Russian� It was in 1853 that Tsar Nikolay I welcomed the inclusion of island 
Sakhalin and Amur region into Russian Empire by stating: “Once the Russian 
flag is raised over it, let it never be lowered!”� This statement, which was given 
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a fresh breath in pro-Russian social networks after the annexation of Crimea, 
can partially explain the contemporary Russian expansionist politics�
The most obvious deduction concerning Russia’s annexation of Crimea is 
that it was easy to accomplish in right time and circumstances� Throughout 25 
years of state’s independence no one in Kyiv seriously considered the systematic 
promotion of Ukraine’s interest on the peninsula – especially the aspects of “soft 
power” and pro-Ukrainian networks� This could not but contribute to the fast 
and swift annexation of Crimea�
However, from another perspective, Ukraine’s modest engagement into the 
affairs of Crimea can be explained as a problem of a young state with a complex 
territorial and ethnic composition� Decision-makers in Kyiv had neither experi-
ence how to govern over Crimea, nor full understanding of how important it 
was to establish good governance there� In its turn, Ukrainian civil society was 
not strong enough to efficiently raise the importance of Crimean issues� Not to 
mention Ukraine’s oligarchs and post-Soviet elites were prone to keep the “infor-
mal practices” and non-transparent governance on the peninsula, this allowed 
them to generate significant “grey” incomes� Finally, no one in Ukraine perceived 
Russia as a serious threat; for a majority of the political elites, oligarchs, and civil 
society Russia has always been a “brotherly nation” with close historical ties�
However, the geostrategic and symbolic importance of Crimea to Russia was 
worth breaking amiable relations with Ukraine� It seems the Kremlin decision-
makers were simply waiting for the right moment�
It was in the 1940s that Yuriy Lypa, one of the prominent Ukrainian geo-
politicians, who argued that the state which ruled the Crimean peninsula com-
manded the whole Black Sea Region; Crimea was nothing but the command 
post of the Black Sea (Lypa, 1942)� Little has changed since that time; geography 
still matters, regardless of technological breakthroughs and the implications of 
globalization�
If to take the Cold War perspective, Crimea was utilized by the Soviets in 
order to project their power in the Black and Mediterranean seas� This allowed 
the Soviets to secure the sea corridor to the Middle East where the Kremlin 
nurtured military and energy partnerships with several states (Delanoe, 2014; 
Götz, 2015)� After 1991 Russia, as the USSR’s successor, struggled to regain 
control over Crimea and thus restore the corridor and re-establish control over 
the Kerch Strait and the Sea of Azov; the 450 km of coastline Russia inherited 
after the Cold War were far from sufficient for the regional projection of power� 
Not to mention that Russia’s Middle Eastern policies were never abandoned�
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As of today, some new arguments should be considered in order to explain 
the Kremlin’s geostrategic thinking� In particular, control over Crimea provides 
a strong defensive point to Russia “against potential air and sea incursions on 
its southern flank” (Delanoe, 2013)� This particular argument gains extra weight 
in light of Putin’s mistrust towards NATO� The latter – according to Russian 
President (Putin, 2007) – adherently breaks its promises not to expand eastwards 
and urges Russia to renew its arms race (Putin, 2015)� Indeed, following such 
antagonistic logics, the situation looks grim from the prospective of the Kremlin� 
As one may recall, Turkey remains an old and proven NATO member with 
a modern fleet, Romania hosts the biggest NATO air base in Europe, and several 
Eastern European states continuously reiterate their NATO aspirations (i�e�, 
Georgia and Ukraine)� Thus, Russia urgently needs to feel itself protected from 
any possible threats and dangers originating in the Black and Mediterranean Sea 
basins (Götz, 2015)� Not to speak of the civil wars and insurgencies smoldering 
on in the Caucasus and in the Middle East; they do also have significant implica-
tions for Russia’s security�
In order to address old and new challenges, Russia is prone to modernize 
its Black Sea Fleet and upgrade its military capabilities� The State Armament 
Program 2011 – 2020 should be particularly considered in this regard� As Igor 
Delanoe writes: “Russia has started a wide modernization program of its military 
forces – the State Armament Program (SAP) 2011 – 2020 – and the upgrading 
of the Russian Black Sea Fleet is believed to be one of the most ambitious parts 
of it, with the expected commissioning of 15 – 18 new units” (Delanoe, 2014)�
Before the annexation of Crimea, Russia was considerably limited in its re-
arming ambitions and development of its naval power� One should mention 
here the bilateral agreements signed between Kyiv and the Kremlin in 1997 and 
2010; these agreements imposed restrictions on the amount of troops and vessels 
Russia could deploy in Crimea� Having annexed the peninsula, the Kremlin 
unilaterally tipped the scales in its favor� With all restrictions removed, Crimea 
is doomed to become a major Russian stronghold in the region�
SAP 2011 – 2020 defines growth of the Russian Black Sea Fleet as one of its key 
state priorities� Apart from pulling on water 15 – 18 new units – including ships 
and submarines – the naval infrastructure of Sevastopol with its eight deep-water 
bays will be significantly improved (Boltenkov, 2011; Delanoe, 2014; Götz, 2015)� 
Not to mention that the new supportive military bases are to be erected in the 
occupied Caucasian territories of Abkhasia and South Ossetia� They will host 
both on-water – whether possible – and land-based units�
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As the purely land-based units in Crimea are concerned, Delanoe writes that: 
“Russia plans to induct Su-24M and Su-30SM for air strike capacities and Il-38 
N for patrolling and anti-submarine capabilities� The annexation of Crimea has 
also opened the path to the deployment on the peninsula of new missiles systems 
such as the Bastion-P coastal battery and S-300 PMU anti-aircraft missiles near 
Sevastopol, effective since March 2014” (Delanoe, 2014)�
All this demonstrates that Russia is deliberately willing to cement its southern 
flank� Implementation of SAP 2011 – 2020 along with the recent updates to Naval 
Doctrine 2011 (e�g�, development of the Black Sea ship-building facilities and 
improvement of the social support for sailors), as well as public statements of 
Russian officials reveal very unequivocal signals (Bodner, 2015)� There are also 
some intelligence leaks that the Kremlin considers deploying nuclear weapon in 
Crimea (Keck, 2015)� In a word, the annexation of peninsula became a notable 
move in the Great Russian geopolitical game�
The Ukrainian response to this Russian move is apparently vague� President 
Petro Poroshenko reiterates that the restoration of Kyiv’s authority over Crimea 
is an issue of major complexity and cannot be fulfilled in the nearest future� In 
his Annual Address to the Parliament on 4 June 2015, Poroshenko did not refer 
to the Crimean issue at all (Dzerkalo Tyzhnia June 05, 2015)� What is worse, in 
more than two years after the annexation, Ukraine has not worked out a consist-
ent strategy of returning Crimea; the only thing officials are speculating about 
resides in granting a special status to Crimea as a Ukrainian territory along with 
applying all diplomatic efforts possible to restore Ukraine’s territorial integrity 
(Dzerkalo Tyzhnia September 06, 2016)�
However, from another perspective, a vague Ukrainian response is an una-
voidable digression of a young state that should accept on its way per aspera 
ad astra; Ukraine is not in a position – de facto – to take a strong individual 
stance against Russia� So far Kyiv attempts to establish the broadcasting of the 
state’s media on the peninsula, coordinate its diplomatic efforts with foreign 
partners, and provide any support necessary to the Crimean Tatars (Bianov, 
2014)� Factually, the only powers consistently defending pro-Ukrainian position 
and cooperation with the West are the Tatars�
The Russian-Tatar relations have always been tense, or even gravely conflict-
ual� In 1783, after Catherine the Great conquered the peninsula, the Crimea 
Tatars – indigenous population – were banished and deported� In 1940s, under 
Stalin’s mass deportation policies approximately 200,000 Tatars were forced to 
move to Central Asia where many of them died� It was only in 1991, after Ukraine 
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declared independence, that the Tatars started to return to their homeland� As 
a result, the Crimean Tatar population counts nowadays approximately 300,000 
(Roslycky, 2011)�
With the Crimean annexation Tatars are destined to experience new chal-
lenges� Their social and political activists are often suppressed by militiamen or 
prosecuted by the pro-Russian authorities� According to Mustafa Dzhemilev, 
the Crimean Tatar leader, a total of 18 Tatars were reported missing during the 
first year of annexation (Shandra, 2015)� A majority of them contacted their 
families later, however some people were found dead� Pro-Russian authorities 
are also working hard to undermine the power of the Mejlis (one of the high-
est executive-representative bodies of the Crimean Tatar people) or to create 
an alternative governing body� For various reasons, selected Tatar individuals 
agreed to cooperate with the new authorities� However, on a larger scale, Tatars 
link their well-being with the restoration of Ukrainian sovereignty over Crimea 
(Shandra, 2015)�
To draw intermediary conclusions, Crimea faces hard times at the moment, 
with no certain prospects for the future� On the one hand, its economy is severely 
undermined by the broken ties with mainland Ukraine and the targeted Western 
sanctions� Social activists – mainly of Tatar origin – experience regular viola-
tions of human rights and political prosecution� On the other hand, the Russian 
Black Sea Fleet and other military facilities are well supported and rapidly built 
up by the Kremlin� Considering the current dynamics, Crimea will become an 
economically underdeveloped and blockaded territory crammed with weaponry� 
This is how the contemporary Russian geopolitical interest in the Black Sea 
Region looks like�
CONCLUDING REMARKS
With numerous anticipatory signs, on 12 February 2007 President Putin publicly 
announced some updates to Russia’s geopolitical objectives� Delivering a speech 
at the Munich Conference on Security, he openly criticized the post-Cold War 
order in the world and positioned Russia as the defiant power� Putin claimed 
that his state was destined to take an individual stance regarding the conditions 
imposed by the U�S� unilateral War on Terror, NATO eastward expansion, and 
the evolving EU neighborhood programs� Moreover, the President condemned 
Western states in conducting double-faced policies; from Putin’s perspective, 
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all “colorful revolutions” and the Middle East interventions were nothing but 
“special operations” by Western states to secure their global domination through 
promotion of democracy� This type of “deceptive behavior” was totally wrong, 
according to Putin; what was worse, this placed Russia in a position of inferiority�
To increase Russia’s global geopolitical weight, Putin and the Kremlin ana-
lysts decided to “mirror the West” and conduct their own “special operations”� 
This can partially explain Russia’s military offensive in Georgia in 2008 and the 
Crimean annexation from Ukraine in 2014�
Speaking of the latter, it was indeed a special operation considered in advance, 
much earlier than February 2007� It took years for Russia to establish multi-
component all-penetrating networks in Crimea, wait for a suitable moment, 
and – finally – undermine Ukrainian governance on the peninsula through 
selective application of “hard” and “soft” power� It was in 2009 that Volodymyr 
Horbulin, the Head of the Council for Foreign and Security Policy, stated that 
Russian strategic goal since 1990s resided in establishing control over – at least 
– South-Eastern part of Ukraine (Horbulin, Litvinenko, 2009)� In turn, in 2011, 
Roslycky wrote the following about Crimea: “Using the Russian Black Sea Fleet 
as an element of Russia’s hard power, certain activities of Russian intelligence 
agencies, pro-Russian organizations and other actors were presented in the light 
of soft power […]� Activities of the Russian intelligence services (particularly 
the 642nd Department of Psychological Warfare), the Moscow State University 
Black Sea Branch and NGOs have targeted every component of Ukraine’s soft 
power security� The Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian Cossacks are 
also linked to the promotion of religious strife and anti-Western perceptions” 
(Roslycky, 2011)�
Acting in tight coordination with one another under the supervision of Rus-
sian intelligence, it took a few weeks in 2014 for Russian networks to transform 
Crimea into a Russian federal subject�
To justify the change in the status of Crimea, from the perspective of inter-
national law, the Kremlin referred to the provisions of Russia’s military doctrine 
and the UN Charter – the latter guarantees the right to every nation for self-
identification – as well as reiterated its intention to protect compatriots abroad� 
Factually, according to the Kremlin’s public statements, the annexation of Crimea 
was an inevitable taking into account the coup d’état in Kyiv, the threats for 
the Russian speaking minorities in Ukraine, and the results of the referendum 
in Crimea� These statements did not convince international society, and in 
particular Western states� The latter even imposed sanctions on Russia in order 
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to moderate its geopolitical ambitions and prevent the Kremlin from further 
interference into Ukrainian affairs�
The history of Russian expansionism – and geopolitical advancements – 
demonstrates that the Kremlin combines strategic long-term planning with 
spontaneous but well-timed ruthless actions� Having its objectives cautiously 
concealed or misrepresented, the Kremlin always waits until the right moment 
to strike� When such a moment comes – as it was with the post-revolutionary 
weakened Ukraine – all means necessary are utilized to achieve the desirable 
outcome (Horbulin, 2015)� This pattern of expansionist behaviour has a long 
tradition; one may trace its roots to the times of Tsar Nikolay I or even earlier – to 
Ivan the Terrible times�
To provide an example, Horbulin states that Stalin’s strategic objective in 
1930s resided in establishing full control over Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia� 
There was never developed, however, a detailed plan how to achieve that objec-
tive� Stalin adopted his decisions ad hoc, according to the situation; each step 
was determined by the weakness of the opponent� This approach proved to be 
efficient; Baltic States fell under the Soviet rule in 1940 (Horbulin, Litvinenko, 
2009)�
In the case of Crimea, “Russian President Vladimir Putin said he was ready 
to put his country’s nuclear forces on alert when he annexed Ukraine’s Crimean 
peninsula last year, in case of an intervention by the U�S� and its allies” (Meyer, 
2015)� As one may deduce, controlling Crimea was a Russian strategic objective; 
its annexation did not depend on the political loyalty of Ukrainian authorities 
– it was just a matter of time and opportunity; Crimean annexation required 
significant courage and improvisation in 2014; in case of any complications, the 
Kremlin was ready to utilize the most powerful weapon in its arsenal� This said, 
contemporary Russia is an outward oriented state which utilizes every proper 
opportunity to expand or indirectly strengthen its influence in the target states7�
The geopolitical importance of Crimea to Russia resides in its necessity to add 
a defensive depth to its southern flank and to nurture the feeling of security in 
7  British historian Arnold Toynbee (1889 – 1975) defined Russia as the permanent Byzantium-
-type state-empire� Russian leaders were considering their decisions and actions always correct and 
indisputable� This encouraged them to pursue domestic and foreign policies with totalitarian confi-
dence; state institutions were also appropriately shaped� The nature of the Byzantium state, as descri-
bed by Toynbee, makes Russia permanently hostile towards the third states, and especially towards 
the West� These two powers are civilizationally incompatible (for more details see: Civilization on 
Trial, Toynbee, 1948)�
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the face of NATO� The issue of security, apropos, has always been important to 
the Kremlin� If to refer to George Kennan’s “long telegram”, written in 1946, the 
Kremlin’s neurotic view of world affairs has always been portraying the outside 
world as “evil, hostile, and menacing” (Kennan, 1946)� On the one hand, this 
allowed Soviet leaders to strengthen their legitimacy within the state and gain 
more support from common people� On the other hand, this justified increased 
military expenditure and fueled Soviet geopolitical expansion� The same pattern 
– security through expansion – is applicable for 21st century Russia; following 
this pattern is only the matter of proper opportunities and right circumstances�
If to look even deeper into history, the mentioned above Lypa argued that 
the constant search for external conflicts was stiffening Russian statehood� 
“War could be easily started because the majority of the population supported 
it eagerly: peasants were waging heavy wars with the administration on their 
lands that they were reluctant, or even looked with hope to gain new territories” 
(Lypa, 1995)� Looking from this perspective, the annexation of Crimea seems to 
be an ordinary deal for Russia; there were even no objections or protests among 
the population condemning this act� On the contrary, a majority of Russians 
were exalted and unanimously approved the deliberations of their leaders� As 
of now, regardless of deteriorating living standards, Russians still gladly believe 
the state’s propaganda and continue to support their leaders in doing a “just and 
right thing”�
As far as Ukraine’s efforts to bring Crimea back are concerned, they can 
hardly be defined as efficient and sustainable� Moreover, contemporary authori-
ties tend to overlook the issue of annexation in their public speeches; at best 
they express themselves in general terms� This makes some sense though; in 
the conditions Ukraine is now – torn between insurgencies and corruption – it 
cannot afford itself a strong stance against Russia’s geopolitical ambitions� Thus, 
the restoration of Ukrainian sovereignty over Crimea – which inevitably requires 
the engagement of the West – is not on the agenda now�
Considering the current dynamics, Crimea under Russian rule is trans-
formed into an economically obsolete territory located at the outskirts of world 
civilization� The only industry which will flourish in Crimea is military; factu-
ally, the peninsula will evolve into the abundantly armed anti-NATO fortress� 
This is how the contemporary Russian geopolitical interest in the Black Sea 
Region looks like�
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